Se não nos viesse a doer, até daria vontade de rir. O papel de Portugal é o papel do pequeno cordeiro que vai ser próximamente sacrificado.
Continuamos com a ideia de que voltámos a 1973. Falta saber em que dia se cantará, "e depois do adeus". Estamos preparados para esse dia. Até 23 de Janeiro de 2011, nada se passará, ainda assim.
O combate vai-se fazer à volta dos apoios/subsídios ao Ensino privado. A luta entre a Maçonaria e a escola católica. Depois, haverá como sempre os que estão no meio, o Policarpo e o Carneiro.
Taxpayers, investors and policymakers are nervously pondering the future of the eurozone given the over-indebtedness of several of its economies, such as Greece and Ireland.
Their worries are augmented by the fact there is no road map for how the crisis might pan out. Yet Latin America’s sovereign debt crisis in the 1980s suggests there is one. A defining decade for the region, it saw many countries shut out of international capital markets and default after they took on unsustainable amounts of debt. The crisis, which almost brought the US financial system to its knees, was resolved only via debt write-offs.
Although the two continents are very different, the similarities between their situations then and now are striking.
That is true of the eurozone today. A back-of-the-envelope calculation shows why. European bank stocks are trading around the book value of their equity. As the combined market capitalisation of European banks is €903bn, that suggests total bank capital is about the same.
As for exposure, a rough figure can be gleaned from the Bank for International Settlements. The total claim of foreign European banks on Greek, Irish, Portuguese, Spanish and Italian debt is almost €1,800bn. European banks’ exposure to potentially troubled eurozone debt may therefore be around twice their capital – comparable to US banks’ in the Latin American crisis.
That is especially so as most banks reportedly still do not carry sovereign debt on their books at market value. In the mid-1980s, the average value of developing loans in the secondary market was 65 per cent of face value (the trough came in 1989 when prices dropped to the low 30s). Today, 10-year Greek government debt trades at 68 per cent of face value, Irish bonds at 74 cents and Portuguese at 87.
If the Latin American timeline holds true, the eurozone crisis therefore still has years to run.
What might a eurozone ‘Brady plan’ look like?
The mechanics are straightforward. Countries would offer a menu of bonds, worth some fraction of current obligations. Take the Brady plan as a template, and haircuts might not be that big. Small countries like Costa Rica won a 47 per cent reduction. Bigger debtors got far less: Uruguay just 20 per cent, and Mexico a mere 12 per cent. More important was that a Brady deal conferred macroeconomic credibility.
That gain in credibility might not work today, given Europe’s longer commitment to free markets. Still, in an equivalent situation, smaller economies such as Ireland, might win big haircuts. Larger and more solvent countries, such as Italy and Spain, would win smaller reductions.
The new bonds would also need collateral sweeteners. Here German-guaranteed “euro-bonds” could play a similar role to the US Treasuries which backed Latin America’s Brady bonds in the 1980s.
Finally, in 1989, Latin America still owed much of its debt to the same creditors as it did in 1982: the commercial banks. Today, by contrast, bond purchases by the European Central Bank, and disbursements made under the European financial stability facility, mean that official creditors may play a larger role in debt reduction. So too, therefore, will politics.
The lessons that Latin America offers are grim. But there is one consolation. European banks are being told, ever more insistently, that they need to build up their capital buffers. The European Central Bank has already doubled its own capital base. That suggests policymakers are aware of what may be coming down the road, and are preparing for it.
That is true of the eurozone today. A back-of-the-envelope calculation shows why. European bank stocks are trading around the book value of their equity. As the combined market capitalisation of European banks is €903bn, that suggests total bank capital is about the same.
As for exposure, a rough figure can be gleaned from the Bank for International Settlements. The total claim of foreign European banks on Greek, Irish, Portuguese, Spanish and Italian debt is almost €1,800bn. European banks’ exposure to potentially troubled eurozone debt may therefore be around twice their capital – comparable to US banks’ in the Latin American crisis.
That is especially so as most banks reportedly still do not carry sovereign debt on their books at market value. In the mid-1980s, the average value of developing loans in the secondary market was 65 per cent of face value (the trough came in 1989 when prices dropped to the low 30s). Today, 10-year Greek government debt trades at 68 per cent of face value, Irish bonds at 74 cents and Portuguese at 87.
If the Latin American timeline holds true, the eurozone crisis therefore still has years to run.
What might a eurozone ‘Brady plan’ look like?
The mechanics are straightforward. Countries would offer a menu of bonds, worth some fraction of current obligations. Take the Brady plan as a template, and haircuts might not be that big. Small countries like Costa Rica won a 47 per cent reduction. Bigger debtors got far less: Uruguay just 20 per cent, and Mexico a mere 12 per cent. More important was that a Brady deal conferred macroeconomic credibility.
That gain in credibility might not work today, given Europe’s longer commitment to free markets. Still, in an equivalent situation, smaller economies such as Ireland, might win big haircuts. Larger and more solvent countries, such as Italy and Spain, would win smaller reductions.
The new bonds would also need collateral sweeteners. Here German-guaranteed “euro-bonds” could play a similar role to the US Treasuries which backed Latin America’s Brady bonds in the 1980s.
Finally, in 1989, Latin America still owed much of its debt to the same creditors as it did in 1982: the commercial banks. Today, by contrast, bond purchases by the European Central Bank, and disbursements made under the European financial stability facility, mean that official creditors may play a larger role in debt reduction. So too, therefore, will politics.
The lessons that Latin America offers are grim. But there is one consolation. European banks are being told, ever more insistently, that they need to build up their capital buffers. The European Central Bank has already doubled its own capital base. That suggests policymakers are aware of what may be coming down the road, and are preparing for it.
The mechanics are straightforward. Countries would offer a menu of bonds, worth some fraction of current obligations. Take the Brady plan as a template, and haircuts might not be that big. Small countries like Costa Rica won a 47 per cent reduction. Bigger debtors got far less: Uruguay just 20 per cent, and Mexico a mere 12 per cent. More important was that a Brady deal conferred macroeconomic credibility.
That gain in credibility might not work today, given Europe’s longer commitment to free markets. Still, in an equivalent situation, smaller economies such as Ireland, might win big haircuts. Larger and more solvent countries, such as Italy and Spain, would win smaller reductions.
The new bonds would also need collateral sweeteners. Here German-guaranteed “euro-bonds” could play a similar role to the US Treasuries which backed Latin America’s Brady bonds in the 1980s.
Finally, in 1989, Latin America still owed much of its debt to the same creditors as it did in 1982: the commercial banks. Today, by contrast, bond purchases by the European Central Bank, and disbursements made under the European financial stability facility, mean that official creditors may play a larger role in debt reduction. So too, therefore, will politics.
The lessons that Latin America offers are grim. But there is one consolation. European banks are being told, ever more insistently, that they need to build up their capital buffers. The European Central Bank has already doubled its own capital base. That suggests policymakers are aware of what may be coming down the road, and are preparing for it.
Cavaco preocupado com a pobreza? Só veta o que lhe interessa, mas ele tem poderes para vetar outros diplomas. Tudo o que é lei contra os mais fracos e desprotegidos ele deixa passar! O que faz ele com as centenas de PETIÇÕES que recebe? nada de nada!
Este ano, por cada dia que passou, foram feitos 53 abortos legais. Em 2007, os números não ultrapassaram os 36. O número de interrupções voluntárias da gravidez tem crescido sucessivamente desde que a prática foi despenalizada há três anos. Em 2009, houve 19 572 contra os 18 607 abortos praticados em 2008 (mais 965). E, até Agosto de 2010, os casos já atingiram o patamar dos 13 mil. Ou seja, a manter-se a média actual, 2010 vai fechar ligeiramente acima do ano anterior, o que contraria a tendência decrescente noutros países europeus que optaram pela legalização.
E, mais do que com os resultados, está desiludido com as mulheres: 354 foram reincidentes e fizeram mais do que um aborto em 2008 e 2009. "Fui ingénuo. Tenho pena que não tenham estimado uma lei feita para salvaguardar a sua saúde: era para protegê-las das complicações dos abortos clandestinos, não para fazerem dois ou três em dois anos."
10 comentários:
Se não nos viesse a doer, até daria vontade de rir. O papel de Portugal é o papel do pequeno cordeiro que vai ser próximamente sacrificado.
Continuamos com a ideia de que voltámos a 1973. Falta saber em que dia se cantará, "e depois do adeus". Estamos preparados para esse dia. Até 23 de Janeiro de 2011, nada se passará, ainda assim.
O combate vai-se fazer à volta dos apoios/subsídios ao Ensino privado. A luta entre a Maçonaria e a escola católica. Depois, haverá como sempre os que estão no meio, o Policarpo e o Carneiro.
Engraçados estes dias de fim de ciclo.
A BESTA ANDA POR AÍ À SOLTA ENTRE S.BENTO E O RATO À ESPERA DO RAIO DIVINO QUE O PARTA.
A comparação da Europa com a América Latina, nos idos de 80:
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/ac9b6954-0d33-11e0-82ff-00144feabdc0.html#axzz18nJNmZOu
Taxpayers, investors and policymakers are nervously pondering the future of the eurozone given the over-indebtedness of several of its economies, such as Greece and Ireland.
Their worries are augmented by the fact there is no road map for how the crisis might pan out. Yet Latin America’s sovereign debt crisis in the 1980s suggests there is one. A defining decade for the region, it saw many countries shut out of international capital markets and default after they took on unsustainable amounts of debt. The crisis, which almost brought the US financial system to its knees, was resolved only via debt write-offs.
Although the two continents are very different, the similarities between their situations then and now are striking.
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/ac9b6954-0d33-11e0-82ff-00144feabdc0.html#axzz18nJNmZOu
The scale of the eurozone problem
That is true of the eurozone today. A back-of-the-envelope calculation shows why. European bank stocks are trading around the book value of their equity. As the combined market capitalisation of European banks is €903bn, that suggests total bank capital is about the same.
As for exposure, a rough figure can be gleaned from the Bank for International Settlements. The total claim of foreign European banks on Greek, Irish, Portuguese, Spanish and Italian debt is almost €1,800bn. European banks’ exposure to potentially troubled eurozone debt may therefore be around twice their capital – comparable to US banks’ in the Latin American crisis.
That is especially so as most banks reportedly still do not carry sovereign debt on their books at market value. In the mid-1980s, the average value of developing loans in the secondary market was 65 per cent of face value (the trough came in 1989 when prices dropped to the low 30s). Today, 10-year Greek government debt trades at 68 per cent of face value, Irish bonds at 74 cents and Portuguese at 87.
If the Latin American timeline holds true, the eurozone crisis therefore still has years to run.
What might a eurozone ‘Brady plan’ look like?
The mechanics are straightforward. Countries would offer a menu of bonds, worth some fraction of current obligations. Take the Brady plan as a template, and haircuts might not be that big. Small countries like Costa Rica won a 47 per cent reduction. Bigger debtors got far less: Uruguay just 20 per cent, and Mexico a mere 12 per cent. More important was that a Brady deal conferred macroeconomic credibility.
That gain in credibility might not work today, given Europe’s longer commitment to free markets. Still, in an equivalent situation, smaller economies such as Ireland, might win big haircuts. Larger and more solvent countries, such as Italy and Spain, would win smaller reductions.
The new bonds would also need collateral sweeteners. Here German-guaranteed “euro-bonds” could play a similar role to the US Treasuries which backed Latin America’s Brady bonds in the 1980s.
Finally, in 1989, Latin America still owed much of its debt to the same creditors as it did in 1982: the commercial banks. Today, by contrast, bond purchases by the European Central Bank, and disbursements made under the European financial stability facility, mean that official creditors may play a larger role in debt reduction. So too, therefore, will politics.
The lessons that Latin America offers are grim. But there is one consolation. European banks are being told, ever more insistently, that they need to build up their capital buffers. The European Central Bank has already doubled its own capital base. That suggests policymakers are aware of what may be coming down the road, and are preparing for it.
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/ac9b6954-0d33-11e0-82ff-00144feabdc0.html#axzz18nJNmZOu
The scale of the eurozone problem
That is true of the eurozone today. A back-of-the-envelope calculation shows why. European bank stocks are trading around the book value of their equity. As the combined market capitalisation of European banks is €903bn, that suggests total bank capital is about the same.
As for exposure, a rough figure can be gleaned from the Bank for International Settlements. The total claim of foreign European banks on Greek, Irish, Portuguese, Spanish and Italian debt is almost €1,800bn. European banks’ exposure to potentially troubled eurozone debt may therefore be around twice their capital – comparable to US banks’ in the Latin American crisis.
That is especially so as most banks reportedly still do not carry sovereign debt on their books at market value. In the mid-1980s, the average value of developing loans in the secondary market was 65 per cent of face value (the trough came in 1989 when prices dropped to the low 30s). Today, 10-year Greek government debt trades at 68 per cent of face value, Irish bonds at 74 cents and Portuguese at 87.
If the Latin American timeline holds true, the eurozone crisis therefore still has years to run.
What might a eurozone ‘Brady plan’ look like?
The mechanics are straightforward. Countries would offer a menu of bonds, worth some fraction of current obligations. Take the Brady plan as a template, and haircuts might not be that big. Small countries like Costa Rica won a 47 per cent reduction. Bigger debtors got far less: Uruguay just 20 per cent, and Mexico a mere 12 per cent. More important was that a Brady deal conferred macroeconomic credibility.
That gain in credibility might not work today, given Europe’s longer commitment to free markets. Still, in an equivalent situation, smaller economies such as Ireland, might win big haircuts. Larger and more solvent countries, such as Italy and Spain, would win smaller reductions.
The new bonds would also need collateral sweeteners. Here German-guaranteed “euro-bonds” could play a similar role to the US Treasuries which backed Latin America’s Brady bonds in the 1980s.
Finally, in 1989, Latin America still owed much of its debt to the same creditors as it did in 1982: the commercial banks. Today, by contrast, bond purchases by the European Central Bank, and disbursements made under the European financial stability facility, mean that official creditors may play a larger role in debt reduction. So too, therefore, will politics.
The lessons that Latin America offers are grim. But there is one consolation. European banks are being told, ever more insistently, that they need to build up their capital buffers. The European Central Bank has already doubled its own capital base. That suggests policymakers are aware of what may be coming down the road, and are preparing for it.
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/ac9b6954-0d33-11e0-82ff-00144feabdc0.html#axzz18nJNmZOu
What might a eurozone ‘Brady plan’ look like?
The mechanics are straightforward. Countries would offer a menu of bonds, worth some fraction of current obligations. Take the Brady plan as a template, and haircuts might not be that big. Small countries like Costa Rica won a 47 per cent reduction. Bigger debtors got far less: Uruguay just 20 per cent, and Mexico a mere 12 per cent. More important was that a Brady deal conferred macroeconomic credibility.
That gain in credibility might not work today, given Europe’s longer commitment to free markets. Still, in an equivalent situation, smaller economies such as Ireland, might win big haircuts. Larger and more solvent countries, such as Italy and Spain, would win smaller reductions.
The new bonds would also need collateral sweeteners. Here German-guaranteed “euro-bonds” could play a similar role to the US Treasuries which backed Latin America’s Brady bonds in the 1980s.
Finally, in 1989, Latin America still owed much of its debt to the same creditors as it did in 1982: the commercial banks. Today, by contrast, bond purchases by the European Central Bank, and disbursements made under the European financial stability facility, mean that official creditors may play a larger role in debt reduction. So too, therefore, will politics.
The lessons that Latin America offers are grim. But there is one consolation. European banks are being told, ever more insistently, that they need to build up their capital buffers. The European Central Bank has already doubled its own capital base. That suggests policymakers are aware of what may be coming down the road, and are preparing for it.
Apocalipse como Livro da Revelação ainda tem muitas desgraças para anunciar.
a besta dispara parelhas de coices para todos os lados
Cavaco preocupado com a pobreza?
Só veta o que lhe interessa, mas ele tem poderes para vetar outros diplomas. Tudo o que é lei contra os mais fracos e desprotegidos ele deixa passar!
O que faz ele com as centenas de PETIÇÕES que recebe? nada de nada!
Este ano, por cada dia que passou, foram feitos 53 abortos legais. Em 2007, os números não ultrapassaram os 36. O número de interrupções voluntárias da gravidez tem crescido sucessivamente desde que a prática foi despenalizada há três anos. Em 2009, houve 19 572 contra os 18 607 abortos praticados em 2008 (mais 965). E, até Agosto de 2010, os casos já atingiram o patamar dos 13 mil. Ou seja, a manter-se a média actual, 2010 vai fechar ligeiramente acima do ano anterior, o que contraria a tendência decrescente noutros países europeus que optaram pela legalização.
E, mais do que com os resultados, está desiludido com as mulheres: 354 foram reincidentes e fizeram mais do que um aborto em 2008 e 2009. "Fui ingénuo. Tenho pena que não tenham estimado uma lei feita para salvaguardar a sua saúde: era para protegê-las das complicações dos abortos clandestinos, não para fazerem dois ou três em dois anos."
http://www.ionline.pt/conteudo/94963-ha-53-abortos-legais-todos-os-dias-em-portugal
a semiramis tem um cancro na conassa
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